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THE RULE OF LAW IN PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS
The first step to an effective international response is to recognize the problem. Informal extremist power structures built around state security and intelligence services, para-military elements, and organized crime must be dismantled. This objective should not be confused with a campaign against organized crime, corruption, and smuggling in a general sense. These will always exist in the Balkans, as indeed they do in virtually every society. The purpose must be to emasculate rogue power structures. To accomplish this, a comprehensive approach is needed to deprive them of their political resources: a capacity for political violence and illicit sources of income. Ultimately, the antidote to this challenge is to institutionalize the rule of law, a process that will require a prolonged period of partnership between reformed local institutions and the international community.
Amb Paddi Ashdown Office of the High Rep in BiH April 2002
PEACE OPERATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
Peacekeeping has inadvertently become one of the Army's primary missions. In the past 10 years the most extensive military intervention and deployment has been to areas like Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. All of which were, comparatively speaking, short duration combat experiences and long duration follow-on peace operations. Peace operations are characterized by separation of belligerents, promotion of peace, and providing freedom of movement for a nations populace, as well as international, diplomatic, and relief agencies.
Interestingly, with this new emphasis on military support to peace operations or peace keeping, there also exists a great deal of ambiguity in definition, doctrine and strategy regarding peacekeeping.
Any discussion of peacekeeping is complicated by the fact that there is no common definition of the term; indeed, this may be one of the causes of the failure in Peacekeeping operations. Nowhere in the articles of the Charter of the United Nations is the word used. It has been applied by journalists, diplomats, academics, and others to describe a wide variety of situations. 1 These terms are incorrectly viewed as synonymous and often used interchangeably. This practice has lead to unclear vision and fragmented focus for military commanders and units developing strategic goals and mission objectives. In an effort to standardize doctrinal guidelines and terms of reference NATO developed a standardization of terms and the US published Joint Publication 3-07.3. Joint Publication 3-07.3 categorizes the terms as "US", "United Nations" and "NATO" acceptable definitions. The definitions are as follows:
Peace-operations-Is a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.
Peace-enforcement-Is the application of military force or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.
Peace-keeping-Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement.
Peace-making-Covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease fire or rapid settlement.
Peace-building-Post conflict actions predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthens and rebuilds governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict .
Peace building missions, like others in the subset of peace operations, echo the roles and responsibilities required of many domestic law enforcement agencies. Establishing the rule of law is paramount in the effort to stabilize a country or region especially following armed conflict.
Early establishment promotes a functioning economy, fair political systems, public confidence in the police and courts, and overall development of a civil society. The military has come to appreciate that often times soldiers must be prepared to assume police duties until a regular police unit can be established. This paper will focus on early establishment of the rule of law and military roles in peace operations, as they relate to Bosnia Herzegovina during the period 1995-2002.
THE RULE OF LAW
The rule of law exists beyond simple law enforcement practices. The term encompasses the scope of principles included in justice and basic human rights. Safeguarding these justices and promoting reforms necessary to re-establish a society in the aftermath of conflict are the catalysts for transitioning to legitimate government and a stable environment. Theory would suggest that police reform is at the foundation of restoring public trust and confidence in the judicial system.
Transnational, regional and global norms, laws and standards of human rights are playing an increasing role in transnational and post conflict societies. The emergence of international regimes, tribunals, and mixed courts is clearly having a significant impact upon transitional peace building. This appears to conform to the growing political consensus that some form of justice and accountability are integral to-and not necessarily in tension with-sustainable peace and stability. In Peace operations international police rarely have the mandate to carry out law enforcement. Usually unarmed, they are supposed to monitor and supervise the indigenous law enforcement agencies. This might be extended to include training and assistance in various forms. Only in exceptional cases have international police been authorized to enforce laws. This is often misunderstood by the public and contributed to a negative image when police could not prevent crimes such as the transfer of the Sarajevo suburbs from Serb to Bosniac-Muslim control. • Monitor and inspect judicial and law enforcement activities, including conducting joint patrols with local police forces • Advise and train law enforcement personnel Analyze the public security threat and offer advice to government authorities on how to organize their police forces most effectively.
• Facilitate law enforcement improvement and respond to requests of the parties, to the extent possible.
The rules of engagement for the IPTF included use of force only in self defense. They were an unarmed force of monitors that relied on the local police as well as IFOR/SFOR forces for their protection. The IPTF also faced the reality that the public security institution was tarnished by involvement in the recent ethnic conflict. In most cases the ethnically based police and judiciary offices they were assigned to were either directly or indirectly involved in the conflicts both pre and post hostility. They lacked a common set of internationally acceptable rules with the exception of human rights. Their presence was widely dispersed and many of them found themselves helpless in the face of ethnically based conflict. News and media portrayed them as unwilling to assist in times of trouble.
The Enforcement Capabilities Gap
The security gap was highlighted in Bosnia Herzegovina, because the military and the police components of the peace operations were handled by two different agencies. (NATO for military and the UN for the police). They still are but at least cooperation between the two has improved. Clearly in an unstable situation it is the military's duty to fill the security gaps from the top down," not expect the police to do this the other way around. That the military did not understand this at first was among the less than satisfactory aspects of NATO 7 .
SFOR and the UN found themselves caught in a capabilities gap for response to many aspects of public disorder. SFOR was reluctant to respond to public disorder and civil disturbance as it distorted their interpretation of the military mandate. It could provide area security and deter lawless behavior but did not consider itself trained to control riots or perform law enforcement. Morris Janowitz notes in his 1960 study, The Professional Soldier, " The military tends to think of police activities as less prestigious and less honorable tasks," and therefore has always been reluctant to become involved in law enforcement issues. Within the military establishment, military police have a lower status than airborne or combat troops. This regimented cultural aversion to participating in "police related" activities significantly restricts capabilities on the ground.
The IPTF was neither armed nor equipped to deal with these armed confrontations in anything more than an advisory capacity. Table 1 . Primarily tied to civil police responsibilities they would also overlap in the areas of counter-terrorism and riot control with the military. Command and control was retained by the Commander SFOR in Sarajevo regardless of the area the unit was operating in and permission from COMSFOR was required by all Multi-national Division Commanders prior to employment or commitment of MSU forces.
UNMIBiH was concerned with the MSU initiative from the outset. It feared that the creation of this organization would take responsibility for law enforcement away from the local police. Furthermore that IPTF monitors would be in the position of providing advice to local police while the MSU intervened in the same situation. The UN mission also felt that the MSU should follow the same law enforcement standards as local police as opposed to the military rules of engagement.
Despite the wide range of missions and capabilities described by Gen Clark at inception, the force was never fully utilized to fill this intended gap, due in part to the discussion previously mentioned. During SFOR 9, the Commander of MND-N requested MSU assistance with the murder investigation of a local teenage muslim girl in the city of Zvornik, a primarily Serbian town. The MSU attempted to assist local police with the investigation but was instructed to cease and desist all actions after complaints from the IPTF commissioner that this was not within their purview. The MSU officer completed the investigation covertly during the SFOR 10 rotation but his findings were never published. Additionally during SFOR 10, the MSU was used Throughout most of its recent history, including the Tito regime, the public security apparatus-the judiciary, police force, and penal system-served as a fundamental instrument of state control. Yugoslavia's disintegration into ethnically defined entities during the first half of the 1990s had the further effect of converting many local police organizations into agents of intimidation and brutality against those of different ethnic origins. Organized crime thrives best where the state is weak and corrupt. Organized crime threatens the stability of strategically important states by instigating corruption and eroding, if not supplanting, legitimate governments. And the profits from organized crime can also be used to bankroll other dangerous groups, including terrorists. 
Military policy Implementation and Strategic Goals
In December 1997 President Clinton refined the support mission to Bosnia again extending the timeline for U.S forces beyond the June 1998 deadline. This time he did not set a new departure deadline, instead he stated that SFOR would remain in place until key implementation milestones had been achieved. These milestones centered around providing a safe and secure environment in the form of monitoring Displaced Civilian and Refugee returns, Judicial Reform, and limited support to nation building efforts. The objectives that were identified by the earlier support to implementation of the Dayton agreement had become less clear over time. The six-month review called for by the president would inadvertently become the ad hoc exit strategy for the U.S forces. Using loosely defined military objectives successful accomplishment of the mission was subjectively declared and commanders and staffs submitted subsequent SFOR rotations could meet requirements of the safe and secure environment with fewer soldiers. Each SFOR rotation would continue to reduce the force structure until a minimal force was left. The focus became troop reduction as opposed to troop to task mission requirements. Re-missioning was based on force protection for US forces. The increasing evidence of organized crime, corruption, and illegal cross border activities was selectively ignored and placed outside the limitations set by Dayton and the GFAP.
PREPARATION AND TRAINING REALITIES: SFOR 10
Much of what is done at the highest levels of military strategy involves converting political objectives into military objectives, crafting a plan to achieve them, and designing a force structure that can achieve implement the plan with in acceptable levels of risk. All this becomes much easier if the objectives and the constraints of politically acceptable risks, are made clear at the outset. The officer corps as a whole is concerned that peace operations are often done with vague mandates, derived from compromises and then presented to the military to interpret and execute. The political signals sent to the military have been lousy," says an expert on the Army who works for a prominent think tank in Washington, "You have a President who has sent them on these missions but insists they not shed an ounce of blood, which sends the signal that these missions are not very important. You have a Congress that keeps signaling that they will be pulling US. troops out of the Balkans, which keeps the Army from establishing a permanent headquarters there. And now, after the Army has finally launched a major reorganization to better cope with these responsibilities, you have President Bush saying peacekeeping is bad and the Army should go back to just focusing on fighting big wars."
This was also an election year for the United States. Though there has been some political pressure, particularly in the United States, to reduce the force size, or at least, the U.S. contingent, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, believe any significant reduction could erode effectiveness and place remaining troops at greater risk. rotation by an additional 800 soldiers. Forty five days from execution, the unit was to identify how they intended to accomplish this reduction with no change in mission requirements.
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Civil Implementation: the International Police Task Force
The military aspects of the Dayton Agreement were implemented well within the first year of the mandate; civilian implementation did not enjoy the same success. In a 2000 assessment of civil implementation of Dayton, public security and illegal activities were listed as having made the least substantial amount of progress of the 10 areas reviewed. This is due in part to the low priority and ad hoc nature with which the international community addressed the reforms needed for the rule of law. Creation of the IPTF as a police monitoring agency proved inadequate to deal with the post conflict situation.
The IPTF was not armed nor empowered to enforce local laws. Because its purpose was to help already established law enforcement agencies maintain public order and assist them in adopting methods of policing consistent with international standards the IPTF could function effectively only with the consent of the Parties. In circumstances where implementation of Dayton ran counter to the interest of one of the Parties, local police either withdrew, or became active protagonists. In such instances IFOR was compelled to become involved . IFOR could conduct operations to deter lawlessness, its forces were not trained or equipped for riot control or law enforcement tasks. There were no effective sanctions available to IPTF to punish non-compliance. He later acknowledged that the composition lacked the robustness and authority necessary to have successfully implemented the outlined civil requirements.
The initial deployment of monitors was painfully slow and lacked the basic logistic base required to begin operations. Most UN monitors also lacked the training skills and background necessary to perform these functions.
The requirements to serve on the first IPTF mission were fluency in English, the ability to drive, and 8 years of experience in policing (as defined in the contributing country) No consideration was given to recruiting personnel with skills essential for tasks other than monitoring (eg. field training officers, police academy administrators, specialists in management or police reform.) During the initial stages of deployment it was not uncommon for IPTF members to fall short of even the basic standards.
14 This provided a bewildering mix of social, cultural, and religious backgrounds with an even more diverse range of professional and law enforcement skills. At times it appeared the only commonality all monitors shared was the concern of practicing domestic law enforcement in another sovereign country. They were not given any executive power nor were they officially 
ESTABLISHING THE NECESSITY FOR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN RULE OF LAW
In the absence of a civilian agency capable of performing security force training in less than permissive environments, the US military has found itself called upon to perform this function. The Armed forces have done so reluctantly. The services have long resisted police activities, and performed training operations only after it was clear no other agency of government could meet the requirements of the mission. A culture of violence, persistent inter-group tensions, and little or no central control of regular and irregular military forces create a condition in which conflicts can re-escalate very quickly. The presence of an abundance of arms and ammunition among civilians and ex-combatants contributes to this continued instability. Soldiers have to be decommissioned and reintegrated into society, and insurgency groups have to be disarmed. This is very difficult to accomplish by local institutions that are neither firmly in place nor legitimate in the eyes of former warring parties. External actors have a critical role to play in this process. Policy statements by both Republican and Democratic administrations emphasize the importance of peace operations in reducing instability and limiting conflict. While it is clear that military force cannot solve the underlying problems of instability, it may create the space for diplomatic and economic efforts to prevent or resolve conflict. In many instances within established parameters, peace operations can be seen as efforts to forestall larger regional conflicts.
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The role of the US Military in Peace Operations is best described as a moving target.
Current operations and requirements in IRAQ are very different from those undertaken in East
Timor or the Balkans in earlier stages. It is better defined as a continually evolving process that is adaptive and flexible. In order for forces to maintain a single focus and synchronize efforts, it is critical to establish clear strategic objectives that provide an operational framework.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Establishment of the rule of law is essential to achieve long term stability in any nation or region. Police forces and rule of law reform are an integral part of this security and stabilization.
Future policy and strategies must accept the rule of law as a critical element of transitioning to a stable post conflict environment and train to that objective. As such, more comprehensive training in Peace Operations is needed for all participants. Strategic ambiguity and political posturing hamper the ability of the military to establish clearly defined objectives. Failure to focus efforts or to continually change focus areas based on the political climate leads to poor performance at the execution level.
If domestic capacities are lacking, external support may be required. External support of transitional processes, by non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations, or through bilateral arrangements, ideally creates the foundations for sustainable progress even after such assistance has ceased. However, such sustained efforts will only work if ownership of the process of capacity building has been transferred to local actors during the transition period.
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The United Nations and other international actors continue to rely on the military as the enablers who set the conditions for the host of domestic activities needed in the aftermath of conflict. The reality of the future is that that the military will continue to play a key role in Peace
Operations. It remains one of the organizations best suited to perform missions throughout the spectrum of Peace Operations, up to and including operations within the "training gap" created in the void between former police agencies and those charged with creating newly reformed law enforcement agencies. This training must be a priority equal to that given to decisive or combat operations. The issues discussed go beyond the superficial training plans and objectives outlined by doctrinal publications. It is the organizational culture of resistance in the military that must change to accept responsibility of the requirements for establishing the rule of law in a post-conflict society.
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